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Abstract:  The degree to which a labor market is segmented and jobs in the formal sector 
of the economy are rationed is critical to the analysis of coverage of social insurance and 
pensions.  In Chile, using unique panel data spanning the 1998-1999 contraction, I find 
little evidence that self-employment is the residual sector of a dualistic labor market, as is 
often depicted in the literature.  Data on transitions between sectors show that self-
employment is not a free-entry sector, and that entrepreneurs can be “pushed” out of self-
employment just as others are pushed out of formal employment during economic 
downturns.  However, employment without a contract does exhibit many of the features 
of the free-entry, employment safety net depicted in the dualistic literature.  An annex to 
this paper, presents supportive evidence from static analysis of selection-corrected wage 
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Are workers in developing countries employed in the informal sector of the economy by 
chance or by choice?  The answer to this question, long debated in the literature on labor 
economics, is also critical to the analysis of income security in retirement and to social 
security policy more generally, with important implications for growth and equity (World 
Bank, 2006). In many developing countries salaried workers are mandated to save for 
retirement in national social insurance systems, while the self-employed – often the 
largest segment of the informal economy - are left to choose whether to save and in what 
form. Where governments enforce this type of partial mandate to participate in social 
insurance – usually due to the difficulty of enforcing contributions from the self-
employed – whether workers are covered by the system can be largely determined by 
where they work.  Further, workers who seek to avoid contributing to social insurance – 
out of moral hazard, a strong preference for present consumption, or in favor of more 
flexible forms of private savings and investment for retirement – may strategically choose 
self-employment or unregulated wage employment to escape the mandate. 
In Latin America and the Caribbean 25 countries require that all salaried workers 
contribute to social insurance.  Of these, only 13 countries require self-employed workers 
to pool risks or save along with the rest of the working population.  Ten countries allow 
the self-employed to contribute on a voluntary basis.  However, even where there is an 
obligation to contribute to social insurance, limited monitoring and enforcement capacity 
allows large segments of workers to evade.
1 
If workers choose the sector in which they work, and the option of “formal” salaried 
employment is not limited by barriers to entry, policy makers in developing countries 
concerned with limited coverage of social insurance should turn their attention to other 
detriments to securing an adequate income for old age, such as individuals’ myopia, 
                                                 
1 The self-employed are required to contribute to national social insurance systems in Argentina, Brazil, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Honduras and Cuba.  Almost all the countries in the Caribbean also require that the 
self-employed participate, with the exception of Antiga and Barbuda.  Participation of the self-employed is 
voluntary in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and 




incomplete or missing capital and insurance markets, and the erosion of household 
savings by inflation.  However, if formal jobs are rationed – either because of a legislated 
minimum wage set above the market-clearing wage, job security provisions, or 
regulations that raise the cost of legal employment – concerns that large numbers of 
workers are employed in an uncovered, “informal” sector – forced to face the risks of 
unemployment, disability, sudden death and poverty in old age on their own - may be 
warranted. 
In this paper I focus on the labor market in Chile – a middle-income country in Latin 
America that in 1981 replaced a large segment of its social insurance system with 
privately-managed, individual retirement accounts, bundled together with market 
insurance against losses from disability and sudden death.  Wage and salaried workers are 
forced to contribute 13% of their earnings, while the self-employed are free to choose 
whether to participate in the system.  Since they are individually owned by workers and 
managed by private, third-party service providers, the new retirement accounts should, in 
theory, sever the link between formal retirement income security and a worker’s place of 
employment.  However, 20 years after the reform, both self-employment and not holding 
a legal employment contract significantly lower the probability of contributing to the 
pension system (Holzmann, Packard & Cuesta, 2001, Packard, 2002, Barr and Packard, 
2000 and 2002). 
Even in countries like Chile that have adopted a social insurance system based on 
individual accounts, knowing how the labor market functions is critical to identifying the 
real barriers to income security in old age.  If legal salaried jobs are not rationed, and 
individuals choose employment in the informal sector, policy makers may be justified in 
expecting the self-employed and informal wage employees to take responsibility for their 
retirement security, whether by contributing to the national pension system or pursuing 
other private alternatives.  Greater effort should be placed on educating workers on the 
need to save and on augmenting capital and insurance markets to provide better 
instruments for individuals and households to manage risks to income over the life-cycle.  
On the other hand, to the extent that workers in the informal sector are queuing along 
with the unemployed for formal jobs, and fail to save primarily because they are not  
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employed in the sector mandated to save, policymakers should not ignore rigidities and 
segmentation in the labor market.  Finally, if workers strategically choose to move in and 
out of self-employment to avoid formal retirement security, policymakers wishing to 
guard social insurance systems against moral hazard and adverse selection may be 
justified in extending the mandate to all workers (Gill, Packard and Yermo, 2004).  These 
issues have been debated recently in Chile, and feature in current proposals to reform the 
pension system (World Bank, 2006). 
Following the introduction, Section II reviews the literature on employment and sector 
choice, presenting competing views of how labor markets function in developing 
countries.  Section III describes the empirical strategy used in this analysis and presents 
the hypotheses to be tested.  Section IV presents historical data on employment trends in 
Chile and describes the variables constructed from responses to two surveys in Santiago, 
collected in the midst of very different macroeconomic climates.  The results of 
maximum likelihood regression techniques are discussed in Section V and Section VI 
concludes. 
II. The Informal Sector and Self-Employment in Developing Countries: An 
Unemployment “Push” or Entrepreneurial “Pull”? 
Much of the literature on labor markets in developing countries characterizes self-
employment and unregulated wage employment as a residual, free-entry, “informal” 
sector where workers who have lost salaried jobs in economic downturns along with 
those who have recently migrated from rural areas, bide their time queuing for rationed 
employment in modern firms (Lewis, 1954, Harris and Todaro, 1970, Fields, 1975 and 
1990, Pradhan, 1995).  This traditional view characterizes labor markets as segmented 
and dualistic. However, several contributions to the literature suggest an alternative view: 
that many individuals choose to work informally, and that self-employment in particular 
is a sector into which agents with a lower aversion to risk, a desire for independence, 
and/or a greater endowment of entrepreneurial talent are likely to self-select (Knight, 
1921, Laffont, 1979). Empirical evidence from both developed (Taylor, 1996, 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 1991 & 1998, Uusitalo, 1999, Guiso and Paiella, 2000) and  
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developing countries (Blau, 1985, Vijverberg, 1986, Yamada, 1996, Maloney, 1998a & 
1998b, Aroca and Maloney, 1999, Maloney 2004) supports the latter view. 
Each characterization of the labor market leads to very different predicted outcomes and 
policy implications.  For instance, if as is argued in the dualistic model, formal salaried 
jobs are rationed and the labor market is segmented by government or union imposed 
rigidities that push the cost of labor above the market clearing wage to where there are 
too few jobs relative to the number of qualified job seekers, a large informal sector is 
evidence of inefficiency and the need for structural reforms (Taubman and Wachter, 
1986).  Alternatively, as in the United States and Europe, many workers in developing 
countries may choose to start small businesses.  Indeed the incentives to become an 
entrepreneur may be even greater in developing countries – rigid regulations may reduce 
the attractiveness of formal wage employment, and the typically low levels of labor 
productivity may reduce the opportunity cost of being self-employed.  Thus the relatively 
large share of self-employed seen in many developing countries may reflect an efficient 
allocation of labor (Maloney, 2000). 
The traditional view of a segmented, dualistic labor market further suggests that the self-
employed will earn substantially less than those in formal salaried jobs.  However, there 
is growing evidence that the self-employed in developing countries earn competitive 
incomes (Vijverberg 1986, Marcouillier, Ruiz de Castilla and Woodruff, 1997), while in 
developed countries, several studies have shown that the decision to become self-
employed is driven by a positive expected earnings differential between salaried and self-
employment (Rees and Shah, 1986, Evans and Leighton, 1989, and Dolton and 
Makepeace,1990).
2  Less tangible factors may also make self-employment more 
desirable, such as greater flexibility, independence, entrepreneurial achievement, job 
satisfaction or an appetite for risk.  Blanchflower and Oswald (1991), Taylor (1996) and 
Robson and Wren (1999) find that in the United Kingdom the independence offered by 
self-employment is a key attraction for individuals moving into the sector, and that the 
                                                 
2 Many studies, in developed and developing countries, find that the distribution of earnings from self-
employment is bi-modal.  In these studies it is often shown that using the mean earnings rather than median 
earnings results in self-employed earnings surpassing earnings in the formal sector.  This is due to the  
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self-employed receive greater returns to entrepreneurial talent.  Blau (1987) draws similar 
conclusions from time series analysis of self-employment in the United States.  In 
developing countries, Blau (1985) finds that the self-employed in Malaysia are endowed 
with greater managerial ability, while conducting an analysis of labor movement in Peru 
from 1985 to 1990, Yamada (1996) finds that only successful entrepreneurs remain in the 
informal sector. 
The two characterizations of the labor market also lead to very different predictions of 
how the share of workers in wage and self-employment will change over the economic 
cycle.  The dualistic model, in which formal salaried jobs are rationed, predicts that the 
share of self-employed will increase during recessions.  High levels of unemployment 
result in fewer offers of salaried employment, and thus many individuals will prefer self-
employment to spending long periods inactive or searching for work.  In this model self-
employment acts as a free-entry, employment “safety net” for the labor market.  The 
dualistic view would, thus, predict counter-cyclical movement in the rate of self-
employment. 
The alternative view suggests a “pull” of aspiring entrepreneurs into self-employment 
when unemployment is low and offers of salaried employment are abundant.  In good 
times, individuals may choose to become self-employed knowing that if their venture 
fails, an offer of formal salaried employment will not be hard to find. Workers 
considering self-employment wait for a favorable business climate to leave a protected 
salaried job (Taylor, 1996). This is to say that in good economic times when aggregate 
demand is high and businesses are more likely to flourish, there is always a wage-
employment safety net that lowers the risks of becoming an entrepreneur.  Accordingly, 
self-employment would show a pro-cyclical pattern – the size of the sector would 
increase with growth and lower levels of unemployment, and shrink during recessions. 
Taylor (1996) shows that the probability of choosing self-employment in the United 
Kingdom increases as the number of unemployed falls. Robson and Wren (1999) also 
find that self-employment in the UK increases when buoyant labor market conditions 
                                                                                                                                                 
higher variance in self-employment earnings, were earnings are derived from a wider range of activities,  
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provide a cushion against failure.  In developing countries, Maloney (1998a & 1998b) 
presents evidence of pro-cyclical movement into self-employment in Mexico, Arango 
and Maloney (2000) find that the share of self-employed in Argentina increases as 
economic conditions improve, while Fiess, Maloney and Shankar (2000) show similar 
increases in the share of self-employed in Colombia, Brazil and Chile during periods of 
expansion.  Furthermore, contrary to the dualistic characterization of self-employment as 
a free-entry sector, Aroca and Maloney (1999) find that younger workers who aspire to 
entrepreneurship are often barred from starting their own business by credit constraints, 
and remain in the formal sector until they have accumulated sufficient capital to start 
their own businesses. 
As discussed above, there are several plausible arguments to explain why individuals 
would prefer self-employment over formal salaried employment. However, most 
empirical analysis finds significant differences between the self-employed and those in 
unregulated wage employment.  Why would individuals prefer to work in informal 
salaried jobs?  In this segment of the informal economy, workers would presumably be 
exposed to all the same risks as the self-employed, but without the compensation of 
greater independence or higher earnings. In a labor market with downwardly flexible 
wages the cost of mandated non-wage benefits are likely to be partially passed on to 
employees in the form of reduced wages.  Should the value of non-wage benefits to the 
worker fall below the perceived tax, even risk averse workers with no significant 
entrepreneurial aspirations may prefer to move into the informal sector and be 
compensated entirely in cash.  Torche and Wagner (1997) show that mandated benefits 
levy an implicit tax, especially on younger workers, even when contributions are closely 
tied to the benefits they receive.  In developing countries where there is less capacity to 
enforce labor regulations, the relatively large sector of small firms and diversity of 
unregulated employment opportunities allow workers to avoid mandated benefits and 
choose how they are compensated (Maloney, 2000). 
                                                                                                                                                 
from low skilled services labor to providing technical experitise, (Cunningham & Maloney, 2001)  
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Workers in informal salaried jobs are often found to earn the lowest wages in the 
economy.
3  However, while they earn significantly less, this is not conclusive evidence 
that these workers are rationed out of better jobs. Informal salaried employment may 
serve as a training area for younger workers just leaving study and seeking experience, as 
well as a conduit to either self-employment or formal wage employment. To the extent 
that workers in this sector of the informal economy are receiving job training for later 
employment, lower wages may reflect the cost of training to the informal employer.   
Hemmer and Mannel, 1989, claim that in many countries informal enterprises train more 
apprentices and workers than formal education and public job-training schemes together, 
and that informal work experience constitutes continued schooling. The relative youth of 
informal salaried workers and the higher rates of turnover in informal wage jobs (relative 
to formal salaried employment and self-employment), provide preliminary evidence of an 
apprenticeship mechanism at work in many developing countries.  Further, informal 
wage employees are often related to the owners of the small businesses where they work, 
and may receive compensation in kind.  Thus while this group of workers best fits the 
traditional characterization of informal employment as the low-paying, residual half of a 
segmented, dualistic labor market, that informal salaried workers earn less does not 
necessarily imply that they are worse off in terms of total welfare (Maloney, 2001). 
III.  Analytical Approach and Hypotheses 
The dualistic, segmented characterization of labor markets in developing countries, 
suggests a hierarchy of jobs.  As discussed in the previous section, according to this 
characterization “better” formal sector jobs are not allocated purely by market forces. 
Distortions introduced by government regulation or strong labor unions, accord 
significantly different opportunities and rewards to otherwise comparable groups of 
workers, and earnings levels in the informal sector are lower than in the formal sector 
even after taking ability into account (Taubman and Wachter, 1986).  The alternative 
characterization posits that individuals seek and find employment in the sector where 
their abilities and attributes will be best rewarded, that the informal sector is a dynamic 
                                                 
3 In Mexico (Maloney, 1998a), Bolivia, (Pradhan, 1995), and in Peru (Yamada, 1996)  
 
9 
outgrowth of the entrepreneurial sector, whose workers largely select informal 
employment for the many non-wage benefits they derive from it. 
Research on labor market segmentation and sector choice typically focuses on earnings 
differentials between informal (self and wage employment) and formal employment 
(Rosenzweig, 1988, Pradhan, 1995, Vijverberg 1986, Marcouillier, et al, 1997).   
However, the traditional approach that relies solely on earnings differentials – even 
controlling for sample selection bias – cannot prove or disprove either characterization of 
the labor market discussed in the previous section (Maloney, 1998a, and 2000).  Wage 
differentials fail to capture the value of unmeasured characteristics of different kinds of 
work, such as non-wage benefits, compensation for risk, independence, in-kind 
payments, or implicit training costs.  Maloney (2000) stresses that the magnitude of the 
distortion-free differential cannot be known beforehand, and thus, that researchers have 
no benchmark against which to compare segmentation.  Just as the premium for entering 
formal salaried work or even self-employment does not imply that either sector is 
superior, or that workers queue for jobs in the higher paying sector, the discount on 
earnings in informal employment cannot be taken as conclusive evidence that the sector 
is inferior. 
For these reasons (and concern for the quality of the available data, discussed in the next 
section) I follow Yamada (1996), Maloney (1998a), and Aroca and Maloney (1999) in 
analyzing workers’ movements across sectors, and in and out of the labor market. To 
examine sector choice in Chile, I model three employment types: a “formal sector” of 
contract-wage employment; and an “informal sector” consisting of non-contract wage 
employment, and self-employment.
4  I estimate the following sector choice equation for 
workers switching in and out of employment, and between the sectors. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4 From the discussion in the previous section, and as shown empirically in Yamada (1996) and Maloney 
(1998a), it is not sufficient to simply lump non-contracted wage employees with the self-employed in a 
single “informal-sector” category.  While the probability of successfully evading the mandate to save in 
Chilean pension system is higher if employees simply collude with employers and declare their income as 
self-employed (Chamorro, 1992, Macias & Tarzijan, 1994), F tests show that the two groups of workers are 
(statistically) significantly different with respect to several variables, notably their age, education and 
household structure.  
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where l is a discrete variable that takes the value j to indicate individual i’s  labor market 
outcome in period t, conditional on i’s sector of employment in t-1 (where j = 0, 1, 2,…, 
k, and k is the number of possible outcomes, including all three sectors of employment 
and unemployment);  E is individual i’s stock of human capital;  K is his endowment of 
physical capital, including assets that can be used as collateral to secure a loan (financial 
capital);  S is the individual’s endowment of social capital – specifically, family and 
friends that may increase the likelihood of access to high-return employment 
opportunities or overcome information asymmetries in the labor market;  Χ is a vector of 
variables controlling for other individual and household characteristics that influence 
sector choice;  j β ,  j η ,  j κ , and  j σ  are vectors of estimated coefficients on the 
regressors, and ν  is an error term. 
Is self-employment a free-entry, residual sector where individuals wait for employment 
opportunities in the formal sector? If there were free-entry into self-employment and the 
self-employed were simply biding their time queuing with the unemployed and informal 
employees for scarce formal jobs, one would not expect individuals with their own 
businesses to be significantly different from the unemployed or from the informally 
employed.  Alternatively, if there were barriers to entry into self-employment – in 
particular, those presented by poorly functioning capital markets constraining credit to 
aspiring entrepreneurs - one would expect to find significant differences.  All else equal, 
workers seeking to enter self-employment would have to accumulate a significantly 
larger endowment of capital with which to cover the costs of starting a business. 
Further, if employment without a contract is also more than just a residual sector, and 
acts as an apprenticeship or job-training institution that leads younger workers to either 
contracted employment or entrepreneurship, one would expect significant differences 
between informal workers and the unemployed with respect to their individual 
characteristics.  If informal employment were an apprenticeship mechanism, all else 
equal, one would expect informal workers (and those entering informal employment) to 
have a smaller endowment of human capital.  Additionally, one would expect  
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individuals’ endowment of relevant social capital – proxied by the number of self-
employed household members other than the respondent
5 – to increase the likelihood of 
employment without a contract over unemployment.  This said, if having other household 
members in self-employment fails to act as a conduit to employment opportunities with 
greater returns and keeps workers trapped in informal jobs, this “social capital” may be 
more of a liability than an asset. 
The specific set of hypotheses that will be tested in the sections that follow are stated 
formally below.  The subscript cw denotes contract (formal) employment; nc, 
employment without a contract;  se, self-employment;  and un, denotes unemployment. 
Ceteris paribus…  Null  Alternative  Implication 
1. Self-employment is a free-entry, 
residual sector where workers queue along 
with the unemployed and the informally 
employed for formal sector jobs. 
j se X X H = : 0  
j se H Ε = Ε : 0  
j se K K H = : 0  
j se S S H = : 0  
for  j=un  and  j=nc 
j se X X H ≠ : 1  
j se H Ε ≠ Ε : 1  
j se K K H > : 1  
j se S S H ≠ : 1  




2. There are barriers to entry into self-
employment, and an individual’s 
endowment of physical capital determines 
whether they become self-employed. 
0 : 0 = j H κ  
for all  i  whose 
1 − ≠
t t l l  
 
0 : 1 > j H κ  
for all  i  whose 
1 − ≠
t t l l and 
whose  se




3. Informal employment is a free-entry, 
residual sector where workers queue along 
with the unemployed for formal sector 
jobs (and/or self-employment). 
un nc X X H = : 0  
un nc H Ε = Ε : 0  
un nc K K H = : 0  
un nc S S H = : 0  
un nc X X H ≠ : 1  
un nc H Ε < Ε : 1  
un nc K K H ≠ : 1  




4. Informal employment a form of 
apprenticeship, and an individual’s 
0 : 0 = j H σ   0 : 1 > j H σ   Null accepted 
implies “no” 
                                                 
5 As discussed in the cross-section analysis in Appendix Three, the number of other household members in 
self-employment significantly increases the probability that the respondent has their own business, and the 
probability that the respondent is employed without a contract.  This may be evidence of entrepreneurial 
traits shared between family members, as found in the United Kingdom by Taylor (1996) and Blanchflower 
and Oswald (1998), or that employment without a contract may act as an apprenticeship offered by family 
members who own their own businesses.    
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endowment of social capital increases the 
likelihood of informal employment over 
unemployment. 
 
for all  i  whose 
1 − ≠
t t l l  
for all  i  whose 
1 − ≠
t t l l  and 
whose  nc
t = l  
 
IV. The Data  
Is Chile’s labor market segmented and dualistic? Gill and Montenegro (1998) find that 
the labor market in Chile functions efficiently, that workers’ endowments of human 
capital are fairly rewarded, and that earnings from labor contribute to greater income 
equality.  Bravo and Contreras (2001) find that the returns from employment to 
individuals’ investment in human capital in Chile are high. Focusing on the period 
between 1990 and 1996, Cuesta (2000) finds that high growth in Chile tightened demand 
for workers in every sector, and further, finds no evidence of constraints on workers’ 
desired labor supply nor of cyclical or structural informal employment.  Gill, Haindl, 
Montenegro and Sapelli (1998) show that from 1987 to 1994 long term unemployment in 
Chile was practically non-existent.  However, studies by Pages and Montenegro (1999), 
Heckman and Pages (2000), and Edwards and Edwards (2000) find that in terms of job 
security provisions, Chile’s labor market is one of the most rigid in the world, and that 
these provisions may discriminate against younger workers increasing their number 
among the unemployed. 
Figure 1 plots annual data on economic growth and the composition of the labor force in 
Chile from 1975 to 2000.
6  The relative stability in the share of self-employed in the labor 
force over the past 25 years is intriguing, especially during the years of sustained 
economic growth after 1984.  Also of interest is the fall in both the share of self-
employed and employees in the labor force with the spike in national unemployment 
during a severe financial crisis in 1982.  If the labor market in Chile were dualistic, and 
self-employment were a free-entry sector or part of the pool of workers seeking formal 
jobs, one would have expected an increase in their numbers shortly after the sudden 
downturn in 1982.  
 
13 
For the empirical analysis in this paper, I employ data from two surveys in Chile – the 
CASEN
7 conducted in December 1998, and the PRIESO
8 gathered in December 1999 
and January 2000.  The second survey was conducted on a sub-sample of respondents to 
the CASEN drawn from Greater Metropolitan Santiago.  Readers will note that the labor 
market conditions at the time of each survey were very different.  Figure 2 shows the 
quarterly movement in the rate of unemployment, the shares of wage employment, self-
employment and new job seekers in Grater Metropolitan Santiago from 1997 – 2000.  
Unemployment in Santiago at the time of the CASEN 1998 stood at 11.4%.
9  Chile was 
just entering a recession in the wake of Russia’s debt default in August 1998 that initiated 
a flight of capital from emerging markets, an increase in domestic interest rates, and an 
economic slowdown in most of Latin America.  In the 12 months between the CASEN 
and the PRIESO the rate of unemployment in Santiago soared to over 15%.  At the time 
of the second survey unemployment had dropped back to 12% (only to rise again in the 
months that followed).  Six months after the first survey and prior to the second, in the 
second quarter of 1999 when unemployment reached its highest level, the share of self-
employed in the labor force rose by 1.13 percentage points, while the share of employees 
declined by 3.7 percentage points (see Figure 2) – a sector adjustment predicted by the 
dualistic characterization of the labor market, albeit a relatively small one. 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Unfortunately the historical data do not allow us to separate informal employees from other salaried 
workers. 
 
7 The Encuesta de Caracterizacion Socio-Economica Nacional (CASEN) is an LSMS-type household 
survey carried out every two years by the Ministry of Planning (MIDEPLAN) through the Department of 
Economics at the University of Chile.  The survey employs multi-stage random sampling with geographical 
clustering.  The survey data are adjusted for non-response, missing income values, and under (or over) 
reporting of different income categories, against the National Accounts System. 
 
8 The PRIESO – Encuesta de Prevision de Riesgos Sociales, or Social Risk Management Survey – was 
designed by the author, and conducted with the help of the Department of Economics at the University of 
Chile on a sub-sample of respondents to the CASEN 1998 of working age from Greater Metropolitan 
Santiago.  The survey combines features of both household and labor market surveys, to gather previously 
unavailable data on savings and social insurance.  While this paper makes extensive use of the labor 
module of the PRIESO. 
 
9 To avoid confusion, readers should note that the data graphed in Figures 1 and 2, are official statistics 
published by the Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas and the University of Chile, respectively, and that there 
are significant differences between these and the rates of unemployment among the sample of working age 




In December 1998, among male respondents to the CASEN of working age (between 14 
and 65) in Santiago, 39.6% where in contract employment, 11.4% were employed as 
salaried workers without a contract, and 17.2% were self-employed (Table 1).  The 
remainder were either unemployed or inactive.  Among working-age male respondents to 
the PRIESO, 42.4% where employed with a contract, 11.7% were employed without a 
contract, and 19.5% were self-employed.  A smaller share of male respondents was 
inactive during the later survey, and a larger share were searching for employment.
10 
A casual comparison of the reported average hourly earnings in each sector in December 
1998 and December 1999/January 2000 (presented separately for men and women by 
their level of educational attainment in Table 2) provides some valuable initial insights. 
In 1998 the self-employed in every category reported significantly (1% level) higher 
earnings than their counterparts in contract employment.  This pattern is repeated in the 
earnings data from 1999/January 2000. 
Readers will note that the earnings data for the self-employed in the PRIESO in Table 3 
is divided into “unadjusted” and “adjusted” earnings to take account of the Chilean 
Government’s correction for underreporting of incomes.  For the 1998 wave of the 
CASEN survey, this correction - minor for salaried employees - involves multiplying the 
reported earnings of all self-employed by 1.955.
11  I have applied the same adjustment 
factor to earnings reported in the PRIESO.
12  While the effect of the adjustment on the 
                                                 
10 If each share is calculated omitting inactive workers, the rates of unemployment and employment in each 
sector closely match the aggregate rates shown in Figure 2. 
 
11 The best available description of this adjustment in English is provided in Litchfield, (2001), and the 
original in Spanish in CEPAL, (1995).  To correct for underreporting of different income categories, the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) uses aggregate income flows in the 
Household Incomes and Expenditures Accounts of the National Accounts System of the Central Bank of 
Chile.  The information in the original Central Bank accounts is converted into the income concepts 
surveyed in the CASEN.  Totals by specific income category from each source are compared, and the 
proportional differences for each income category between the two sources are imputed uniformly to each 
income recipient in the CASEN.  The underlying assumption is that miss-reporting differs fundamentally 
across income categories (income from a rental property, versus earned income, or earnings in the different 
sectors of employment), rather than income levels.  Incomes reported by wage employed workers are 
adjusted by 1.004, pension benefits by 1.347, income from rental property by 1.069, and imputed rent 
(what the homeowner says his property would be worth if rented) by 0.439. 
 
12 Although the two surveys interview the same sample, and the labor module in the PRIESO is designed to 
be compatible with that of the CASEN, it is not strictly methodologically correct to apply the CEPAL  
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significance of the positive earnings differential between self and contract employment is 
dramatic, the earnings of the self-employed without the adjustment are still greater for 
every category of educational attainment (for men), and even significantly greater among 
respondents who only completed primary education.  However, the adjustment changes 
the signs of the earnings differentials between women in self-employment and contract 
employment in the categories with the lowest and the highest educational attainment. 
The apparent premium on self-employment remains even after earnings are corrected for 
sample selection bias (see Table 4) with the two-step procedure proposed by Heckman 
(1979) and Lee (1983) (see Appendix Three).  Using the two-step procedure, I identify 
positive sample selection into self-employment and employment without a contract in 
1998.  As discussed in Appendix Three, these results would seem to negate the dualistic, 
segmented characterization of the labor market in Chile.  The positive selection into self-
employment might reflect any number of unobservable traits, such as flexibility, 
motivation, entrepreneurial ability, greater tolerance of risk, and/or greater desire for 
independence.  Similarly, positive selection into informal wage employment may be 
evidence of an apprenticeship mechanism at work (motivating the inclusion of the 
relevant “social capital” variable discussed in the previous section).  However, the results 
of the Heckman-Lee procedure reported in Appendix Three are not robust to even small 
changes in the sample.  Nor do the results hold when the procedure is conducted on the 
same sample of workers from one year to the next. 
There are further problems with relying on the earnings data alone.  While the data show 
a significant premium in self-employment even prior to the adjustment for under-
reporting (among men in Table 3), and after correcting for possible sample selection bias 
(in Table 4), they may suffer from serious and potentially systematic (i.e. bias-causing) 
measurement error.  The earnings question in the CASEN - and the same question 
                                                                                                                                                 
adjustments to the PRIESO earnings data.  First, the adjustment factor is calculated using national accounts 
data, and the PRIESO is only representative of Greater Metropolitan Santiago.  Second, the adjustment 
factor was calculated using reported earnings and national accounts data from the same year.  I have 
applied an adjustment factor calculated in 1998 to earnings data reported in 1999.  However, regional 
accounts are not separately kept in Chile, and the CEPAL adjustment factor for earnings from self-
employment has varied only slightly in the last three waves of the CASEN (over the last 6 years).  Thus for 




repeated in the PRIESO - asked respondents for their “liquid” or take-home income in the 
last month.  However, self-employed respondents are not asked about the capital costs of 
their businesses, wages paid to employees, or other costs of operation.  Nor are these 
costs among the items respondents are asked to deduct from what they report.
13  Thus, the 
“earnings” reported by the self-employed may still include their business costs, leaving 
researchers no way to distinguish profit from revenue.  This could explain the premium 
on self-employment in Chile, even before the data are adjusted for under-reporting.
14  
Further, since the earnings of the self-employed include a return to physical capital, as 
well as labor and human capital, the data may not be comparable across sectors.  The 
designers of the CASEN survey are confident that the phrasing of the earnings question 
elicits data that are comparable across sectors of employment.  However, since the 
phrasing of the question is notably biased toward wage and salaried employment, and no 
follow up questions are asked, researchers cannot be certain. 
Out of concern for the instability of the results of correcting for sample selection bias in 
Appendix Three, and the comparability of the data discussed above, this paper places 
greater emphasis on workers’ movements between sectors and on data other than actual 
earnings.  The deepening recession and consequent spike in unemployment between the 
two surveys offers an excellent natural experiment.  Although a casual examination of the 
data on workers’ transitions does not provide conclusive evidence to support either thesis 
of developing country labor markets, there are some interesting patterns. 
Of the 2278 respondents to the PRIESO, 33% changed their labor market status in the 
twelve months between the two surveys (see Table 5).  Of the 1068 male respondents, 
34% changed their status (see panel (i) of Table 5).  Among male respondents who 
switched, the largest group went into contract employment – a surprising pattern in the 
                                                 
13 The CASEN asks respondents to report “liquid” earnings from their principal occupation in the last 
month.  They are specifically asked to deduct taxes, bonuses and any cash benefits they receive (such as 
child support allowances) from this amount.  The questions is phrased:  “En el mes pasado, cual fue su 
ingreso o remuneración liquida en su ocupación principal? Incluya: los descuentos por prestamos y 
consumos en casas comerciales.  Excluya: Las asignaciones familiares, bonificaciones, gratificaciones, 
descuentos provisionales y de salud.” 
 
14 I am grateful to Dr. Geeta Kingdon for pointing out the potential danger of not accounting for the 
operating costs of the self-employed.  
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context of a recession, and one that would contradict the segmentation hypothesis.  The 
second largest group of switchers went into non-contract employment, and the third 
largest into self-employment.  Of those switching out of self-employment, the largest 
group became inactive, although among men who switched out of self-employment most 
entered contract jobs (second to last panel (v)) – again, a pattern that would contradict the 
segmentation hypothesis, given the levels of unemployment.  However, among 
respondents who left contracted employment, most went into non-contract jobs – a 
pattern more consistent with a dualistic characterization of the labor market. 
V. Results  
Table 6 lists the variables used in the analysis.  These include respondents’ individual and 
household characteristics that proxy for factors influencing labor supply (whether the 
respondent is head of household, married, their number of younger and older dependent 
children, and whether the respondent resides in a rural area);
15 their endowment of human 
capital (captured by age and years of formal education); their physical capital (proxied by 
a binary variable COLLAT, equal to one if respondents reported owning their home 
and/or another residential property in 1990 that could act as collateral for a loan);
16 and 
their endowment of relevant social capital (proxied by the continuous variable 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
15 As an example of how these factors can influence labor supply decisions, heads of household, especially 
those that are married and who have a greater number of dependent children, may be more likely to take up 
a job in an “inferior” sector out of desperation should they loose formal employment.  Further, the 
employment options of individuals living in rural areas may be relatively constrained.  There is a potential 
problem of reverse causality with some of these control variables – that is, individuals with higher paying 
jobs in the formal sector can afford to get married or have more children, etc..  However, since this analysis 
focuses primarily on transitions between sectors in a twelve month period, I have chosen to leave the 
variables in the model.  Estimations without the controls do not lead to significantly different results from 
those reported in this section. 
 
16 In testing for sample selection into self-employment, as discussed in Appendix Three, I used the 
COLLAT variable in the Heckman-Lee procedure on PRIESO respondents.  While the coefficient on 
COLLAT was strongly significant (1%) for selection into self-employment, I was still unable to replicate 




NOTHSEL – the number of household members other than the respondent who declare 
themselves as self-employed).
17 
Table 7 shows the mean values of four variables of particular interest, AGE, YEDU, 
COLLAT
18 and NOTHSEL, for each sub sample of respondents: workers with a contract 
in December 1998 who stayed in contract employment in December 1999; those that left 
or lost their jobs and took up employment without a contract; those who went into self-
employment; who were still searching for a job; and those who left the labor market 
altogether.  The mean values of each of the variables are shown for analogous sub-
samples of respondents who were employed without a contract, self-employed, 
unemployed and inactive in December 1998.  For the sake of brevity, I only report the 
results of tests for significant differences between certain sub-samples. 
The results of two-tailed tests for significant differences in the means between the various 
groups of interest are very revealing.  Although workers with a contract are significantly 
(5% level) older than those without a contract, and younger (1% level) than the self-
employed, they are not significantly more educated than workers in either branch of the 
informal sector.  Workers who left (or lost) a formal job and who became self-employed, 
while significantly (10% level) younger, are significantly (5% level) more educated, and 
as a group hold significantly (1% level) more collateral than workers who remained in 
formal employment.  There is no significant difference between workers who left or lost 
formal jobs to take up employment without a contract and those that stayed in the formal 
sector, other than as a group those that remained formally employed held significantly 
(1% level) more collateral.  Respondents with a formal job are significantly (1% level) 
older and significantly (10% level) more educated than the unemployed.  However, while 
those that left the formal sector and were still searching for a job are significantly (1% 
                                                 
17 Of the 4,637 self-employed respondents to the CASEN 1998 in Santiago, 66% were the only self-
employed in their household.  The remainder reported as many as five other household members with their 
own businesses.  Of the 11,808 contract workers in the same sample, 82% had no other household members 
who where self-employed, and the rest reported up to four members with their own businesses.  Over 76% 
of the 4071 workers without a contract in Santiago had no self-employed household members, and the 
remainder reported as many as four.  The number of other household members with their own business was 




level) younger than those who held on to formal jobs, there is no significant difference in 
the education of the two groups. 
Significant differences between the two branches of the informal sector are also apparent 
from the mean data in Table 7.  Self-employed respondents are significantly (1% level) 
older and more educated (5% level) than informal employees, and are significantly (1% 
level) more likely to hold collateral.  Similarly, workers who left the formal sector for 
self-employment are significantly (1% level) more educated than those who took up jobs 
without a contract.  While there is no significant difference in the ages of the two groups, 
the former hold significantly (1% level) more collateral, and have a significantly (10% 
level) greater number of fellow self-employed in their households.  Further, there are 
differences between the self-employed and the unemployed.  The self-employed are 
significantly (1% level) older, more educated (5% level), and more likely (1% level) to 
hold collateral than the unemployed.  Although not shown in Table 7, the self-employed 
are significantly (1% level) more likely to be heads of household, and more likely (1% 
level) to be married than respondents searching for a job. 
The are revealing differences between respondents who moved into formal employment 
from another sector and those that stayed.  Former entrepreneurs who moved into a 
contract job, while significantly (1%) younger, have significantly (10% level) more 
education, hold the same amount of collateral, but have significantly (1% level) fewer 
other household members in self-employment than those who remained self-employed.  
There is no significant difference in age and education between workers without contracts 
who moved into the formal sector and those that remained in the informal sector.   
However, workers that remained informal as a group held significantly (10% level) more 
collateral.  Job seekers who found a formal job were significantly (5% level) younger 
than those that continued to search, but otherwise there were no significant differences 
between the groups. 
There is greater similarity between unemployment and informal employment.  There are 
no significant differences between workers without a contract and job seekers with 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 As a binary variable, the mean value of COLLAT for each sub-sample is the percentage of that sample  
 
20 
respect to most of the variables in the model, with only two exceptions.  Informal 
employees are significantly (10% level) more likely to be heads of household, and to 
have a significantly (1% level) greater number of children.  These particular differences 
conflict with the characterization of informal employees as young apprentices, and 
suggest that job-search in Chile may be a luxury that respondents supporting large 
numbers of dependents cannot afford.  To underscore this interpretation, there is no 
significant difference in age and education between workers who remained informally 
employed and those that “graduated” onto employment with a contract or into self-
employment (although those that started their own businesses are significantly (5% level) 
older than those that entered the formal sector). 
Table 8 (extending over two pages) shows the results of a single multinomial logit 
estimated on the entire sample of active male respondents interviewed in the PRIESO, 
where the dependent variable is the respondents’ sector of employment or unemployment 
in December 1999-January 2000, and the omitted reference category is contract 
employment.
19  All of the variables in the model were interacted with dummies to control 
for respondents’ sector of employment, unemployment, or inactivity in 1998.
20  T h e  
coefficients estimated in the multinomial logit are relative marginal probabilities and can 
be interpreted only with reference to the omitted category – employment with a contract 
in 1999/2000.  Thus, I perform a series of F tests for significant differences between the 
estimated coefficients on the variables of particular interest (AGE, AGE
2, YEDU, 
COLLAT and NOTHSEL) to better interpret the results of the model. 
The pattern of transitions between the two surveys is obviously more complex than the 
dualistic characterization of the labor market would predict.  Few of the estimated 
                                                                                                                                                 
with collateral in 1990. 
19 I ran a single regression (instead of separate regressions for each sector), in order to use the smaller 
sample size in the PRIESO more efficiently.  Inactive respondents were excluded from the regression.  As 
in the analysis of the CASEN sample in Appendix Three, workers who declared themselves inactive in the 
PRIESO were found to be significantly different from those still searching for a job.  Further, there was an 
insufficient number of workers that left the labor market (to become inactive) to allow parameters to be 
estimated efficiently.  Workers who were inactive in the CASEN 1998 and entered the labor market prior 
to the PRIESO are included. 
 
20 The regressors are sorted in the rows of Table 8 according to respondents’ sectors of origin.  The 
columns of Table 8 are respondents’ destination sector.  
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coefficients on the variables controlling for individual and household characteristics were 
significant to workers’ switching patterns.  Relative to workers who were formally hired 
at the time of the PRIESO, those who left contract jobs and were still searching for 
employment were significantly (10% level) less likely to be married.  Those that took up 
self-employment, on the other hand, were more likely to be married and to live in rural 
areas.
21  Workers without a contract in December 1998 who remained informally 
employed came from households with a significantly (5% level) greater number of 
children between the ages of 10 and 13. 
Among respondents who left self-employment, those still searching for a job were 
significantly (1% level) more likely to be heads of household than their counterparts who 
found formal employment.
22  Former entrepreneurs who took up jobs without a contract 
were significantly (10% level) less likely than those with contract jobs to be married.  
Little can be said about the individual and household characteristics of respondents 
moving out of unemployment or into the labor market, except that the unemployed who 
started their own businesses came from households with a significantly (5% level) greater 
number of younger children than those that found a contract job. 
Respondents’ endowment of human capital, proxied in the model by age and years of 
education, was not as significant a determinant of movement between the sectors as the 
other variables of interest.  Neither respondents’ age nor their years of education 
significantly increased the likelihood of their finding formal jobs over employment in 
either branch of the informal sector.  However, compared to workers in formal 
employment (with a contract) in December 1999, those who left or lost a contract job and 
were less educated were significantly (10% level) more likely to still be searching for 
employment.  Turning to the results of the F-tests, a greater endowment of education 
significantly (5% level) increased the likelihood that workers leaving the formal sector 
would start their own business rather than find themselves unemployed.  Although there 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
21 These results are not surprising given that the self-employed are relatively older, and that a switch to 
agricultural self-employment is more likely in rural areas. 
 




was no significant difference in the coefficients on the education variable between former 
contract workers who where searching for a job and those employed informally (without 
a contract) in December 1999, older workers were significantly (10% level) more likely 
to have found employment in the informal sector while younger workers who were more 
likely to still be searching. 
As shown in the table of mean values, workers with a contract who left the formal sector 
to start their own businesses were significantly (10% level) older, and had significantly 
(at 5%) higher education levels than those who stayed.  However, although the mean age 
and level of education of respondents who left contract jobs for self-employment is 
significantly greater than that of those who stayed in the formal sector, F tests failed to 
find any significant difference in the estimated coefficients on age and education between 
the two groups. 
The self-employed in December 1998 who continued to run their own businesses a year 
later, were significantly (1% level) more likely to be older than those who left the sector 
for formal jobs.  Further, there was no significant difference in the level of education 
between those that continued to run their own businesses and the self-employed who left 
for employment in the formal sector (or for jobs without a contract).  However, compared 
with respondents who left self-employment to take up jobs with a contract, those with 
less education were significantly (1% level) more likely to still be searching for jobs.  
These workers were also significantly (1% level) less educated than respondents who left 
self-employment and took up informal employment or those who remained self-
employed. 
Age and education seem to have been even less important to the movement of workers 
out of informal employment.  Although workers without a contract in December 1998 
who were searching for a job a year later, were significantly (10% level) older than those 
that remained informally employed, the estimated coefficient on education is not 
statistically significant to the movement of informal workers into any other sector.   
Follow-up F tests confirm that there is no significant difference in the estimated 
coefficient on education between workers who were still searching and those who  
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remained in non-contracted jobs.  Nor were age and education significant determinants of 
whether workers remained informally employed of opened their own businesses.   
Furthermore, there was no significant difference in the estimated coefficients on either 
age or education between those that remained informally employed and those who moved 
out of informal employment for jobs in the formal sector. 
In contrast, workers’ endowment of physical capital (and access to financial capital), 
proxied by their holding of collateral, was highly significant to their switching patterns 
between the sectors.  The most striking feature of the transitions out of contract 
employment is that respondents were sorting between the two branches of the informal 
sector according to their holdings of collateral.  Compared to those who remained in 
formal employment, workers leaving the formal sector to become self-employed were 
significantly (5% level) more likely to have the collateral with which to start a business.  
In contrast, those who took up employment without a contract were significantly (10% 
level) less likely to hold collateral.  F tests confirm this result.  Workers who either left or 
lost a job in the formal sector to become self-employed were significantly (1% level) 
more likely to hold collateral than those that took a job without a contract.  This may be 
evidence of either a considered, strategic move into self-employment, or of workers using 
their collateral to start a business to cope with involuntary job loss.  The latter 
interpretation is supported by the finding that new entrepreneurs were significantly (10% 
level) more likely to hold collateral than those who left a contract job but were still 
searching for employment in 1999. 
A collateral endowment (or the lack thereof) was also an important determinant of 
transitions into and out of the remaining sectors.  The estimated coefficient on COLLAT 
for self-employed workers who took up employment without a contract is negative and 
highly significant (at 1% level).  Entrepreneurs in 1998 who took up jobs without a 
contract or who were still searching for employment in 1999 were significantly (1% 
level) less likely to hold collateral than those who were still self-employed.  These results 
may be evidence of a cyclical “push” out of self-employment, and indicate that the self-
employed with collateral may have been able to secure credit with which to ride out the 
adverse business climate brought by the recession.  Although F tests cannot find  
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significant differences in the estimated coefficients on COLLAT between those who left 
self-employment for contract jobs and those who remained in the sector, the difference 
between former self-employed in contract and non-contract jobs is highly significant.  
Former entrepreneurs who took a job without a contract had significantly (1% level) less 
collateral than those that entered the formal sector.  These former entrepreneurs who went 
into the formal sector may have used their collateral endowment to leverage financing for 
a more extended job search than those without assets could afford.
23 
There was no significant difference between the coefficients on the collateral variable 
between the unemployed who took up jobs without a contract, and those still searching.  
Nor was there a difference between former job seekers who entered informal 
employment, self-employment, or the formal sector.  Similarly, the estimated coefficient 
on collateral was not significantly different from zero for transition into the labor market, 
regardless of the sector where formerly inactive respondents became employed. 
Respondents’ endowment of social capital, proxied in the model by the number of other 
household members in self-employment, had a significant, if only a minor, effect on their 
switching patterns. As shown by the estimated coefficients on NOTHSEL in Table 8, 
compared with the formally employed, the self-employed who continued to run their own 
business; those who left self-employment and took jobs without a contract; and those 
who were searching for employment in December of 1999, were significantly (10% 
level) more likely to have a greater number of other household members who were self-
employed.  While less apparent in the regression results in Table 8, F tests show that 
respondents that left self-employment and found contract jobs, had significantly (5% 
level) fewer self-employed household members than those that continued to run their own 
business.  Those who left self-employment and took up a job without a contract had a 
significantly (10% level) greater number of household members who were self-employed 
than those that found formal jobs. 
                                                 
23 I am confident that the collateral variable is capturing more than just the effect of greater earnings 
capacity.  While I have refrained from including actual and predicted earnings data in the model, for the 
reasons discussed in Section IV, the signs and significance of the estimated coefficients on the collateral 
variable are very similar even when actual and predicted earnings are included as control variables.  
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However, there is little evidence of an apprenticeship mechanism at work.  The 
significance of other self-employed household members to respondents’ transitions may 
simply be evidence of entrepreneurs coping with an adverse economic climate by relying 
on family members to find work while they recover from a shock.  There is no evidence 
that the number of self-employed in the household significantly increases the likelihood 
of self-employment or employment without a contract over unemployment among job 
seekers, and those entering the job market for the first time. 
VI. Conclusion 
Are workers in developing countries employed in the informal sector by chance or by 
choice?  The answer to this question is critical to the analysis of individual income 
security in retirement in countries where one sector is mandated to contribute to social 
insurance and others are not. In this paper I have focused on the labor market in Chile 
where the government enforces a partial mandate to participate in the social security 
system.  Employees are mandated to contribute to individual retirement accounts, while 
the self-employed are left to choose whether to contribute.  To the extent that they can 
evade labor market regulations, salaried workers without a contract can also avoid 
contributing. 
If contracted jobs are not rationed, and individuals choose employment in the informal 
sector, policy makers may be justified in expecting the self-employed and informal wage 
employees to take greater responsibility for financing their retirement, and should turn 
their attention to other detriments to securing an adequate income for old age.  However, 
if workers in the informal sector are queuing along with the unemployed for formal jobs, 
and the only reason they fail to save is that they are not working in – or have been pushed 
out of - the sector mandated to save, policymakers cannot afford to be complacent, and 
should work toward removing obstacles to formal employment. 
The results reported in the previous section can be summarized as answers to the 
hypotheses presented formally in Section III.  Is self-employment a free-entry, residual 
sector where workers queue along with the unemployed and the informally employed for  
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scarce formal sector jobs? A casual analysis of the data on labor market transitions in 
Chile shows little evidence that jobs in the formal sector are especially scarce.  The 
largest share of workers who left either branch of the informal sector, as well as the 
largest group of job seekers who found employment, took up formal sector jobs.   
Furthermore, there is no evidence that self-employment is part of the residual sector of a 
dualistic labor market.  The self-employed in Chile are clearly distinct from both the 
unemployed and workers employed without a contract.  The self-employed are 
significantly older, more educated, more likely to be heads of household, and more likely 
to hold collateral than either the informally employed or the unemployed. 
There are significant barriers to entry into self-employment.  An endowment of physical 
capital increases the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur over employment in any 
other sector.  Workers who left or lost jobs in the formal sector, sorted between self-
employment and informal employment depending on whether they held collateral.  These 
workers may have been using their endowment of collateral to cope with job losses from 
the negative shock to aggregate demand during the recession in Chile.  Just as with 
workers leaving contract jobs, those who left self-employment for non-contract jobs were 
significantly less endowed with collateral than those that continued to run their own 
businesses.  These former entrepreneurs may not have had access to the extra capital 
necessary to weather losses from the recession. 
Is informal employment a free-entry, residual sector where workers queue along with the 
unemployed for formal sector jobs? Unlike self-employment, employment without a 
contract does exhibit the characteristics of the free-entry, residual, employment safety-net 
depicted in the dualistic literature.  Workers without a contract are almost 
indistinguishable from the unemployed.  However, those employed without a contract are 
more likely to be heads of household and to have a greater number of dependents to 
support. Further, despite the positive self-selection into informal employment found in 
Appendix Three, individuals’ endowment of social capital – the number of other 
household members in self-employment – has no significant effect on the likelihood they 
are employed informally rather than unemployed.  
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To summarize, in Chile, I find evidence of both an entrepreneurial “pull” into self-
employment as well as a cyclical “push” into and out of the sector due to adverse 
macroeconomic conditions. However, there is little evidence indicating that self-
employment is the residual sector of a dualistic labor market.  Entrepreneurs are not 
queuing for jobs in the formal sector, and can be “pushed” out of self-employment, just 
as others are pushed out of formal employment during economic downturns.  In contrast, 
employment without a contract does exhibit many of the features of a free-entry, 
employment safety net.  Workers without a contract are virtually indistinguishable from 
those searching for a job, and are likely to have taken up informal employment out of 
greater necessity to support dependants. 
The results presented in this paper indicate that policy makers concerned for limited 
coverage of the reformed social insurance system in Chile, should worry less about where 
workers are employed.  Since there is little evidence that contract jobs are rationed, and 
the results presented suggest that individuals choose self-employment, interventions to 
ensure adequate income in old age might be better concentrated on maintaining sound 
macroeconomic management, spreading awareness of income needs in retirement and the 
importance of savings, as well as on correcting failures that constrain capital and 
insurance markets from offering households a greater array of savings, investment and 
insurance instruments.  This said, the evidence presented also suggests there may be 
cause for concern for workers employed without a contract.  This may indicate a need not 
only to increase governments’ capacity to enforce the mandate to participate, but also to 
lower the transactions and compliance costs of affiliating workers and maintaining their 
contributions up to date.  Further, the apparent impact of economic downturns on workers 
in the formal and informal sectors alike, suggest that special provisions may have to be 
made for those who stop contributing to the pension system due to job-loss during crises, 
to shorten periods without cover against the more immediate risks to household income 
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Figure 1. Composition of the Labor Force and Related Macroeconomic Indicators in 
Chile, 1975 - 2000 























































Figure 2. Unemployment and Labor Force Composition, Greater Metropolitan 
Santiago, 1997 – 2000 
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Table 1. Sector Allocation of Santiago’s Labor Force,  
CASEN 1998 & PRIESO 1999/2000 
 
  December 1998  December 1999/January 2000 
  No.  Obs. % No.  Obs. % 
      
Inactive 4699  24.8  202  18.9 
Unemployed  1304  6.9 80 7.5 
Non-Contract Employee  2161  11.4  125  11.7 
Self-employed 3262  17.2  208  19.5 
Contract Employee  7490  39.6  453  42.4 
      






Table 2. Average Hourly Earnings by Sector and Educational Attainment, and 
Earnings Differentials, CASEN 1998 
 







cw - nc  se - cw  se - nc 
Men    
Some primary  701.805  582.965 1599.984  118.84*** 898.18***  1017.02*** 
Complete primary  736.600  644.685 1723.663  91.92**  987.06***  1078.98*** 
Some secondary  809.611  664.072 1889.496  145.54***  1079.89***  1225.42*** 
Complete secondary  1026.323 871.243 3035.858  155.10***  2009.54***  2164.61*** 
Some tertiary  1651.376  1426.951 5627.220  224.43*  3975.84***  4200.30*** 
Completed tertiary  4099.920 3007.210  10650.740 1092.71*  6550.82***  7643.53*** 
         
Women         
Some primary  606.033  599.288  1618.223  6.75  1012.19***  1018.94*** 
Complete primary  647.352  633.491 1442.869  13.86  795.52*** 809.38*** 
Some secondary  658.306  651.034 1704.425  7.27  1046.12***  1053.39*** 
Complete secondary  881.573 800.801  2772.297  80.77**  1890.72***  1971.50*** 
Some tertiary  1392.310  1329.792 4177.154  62.52  2784.84***  2847.36*** 
Completed tertiary  2727.998  3159.127 7505.059  -431.13  4777.10***  4345.93*** 
          







Table 3. Average Hourly Earnings by Sector and Educational Attainment,  
and Earnings Differentials, PRIESO 1999/2000 
 
  Hourly Earnings  Real Earnings Differentials 
  cw  nc  se  cw- nc  se - cw (1)  se - cw (2)  se - nc (1)  se - nc (2) 
     Unadjusted  Adjusted       
Men         
Some primary  716.29  551.40  720.37  1408.32 164.89***  4.08 692.03*** 168.97**  856.92***
Complete primary  828.64  634.62  1579.77 3088.45  194.02  751.13*  2259.81**  945.15 2453.83***
Some secondary  848.92  649.48  1375.21 2688.53  199.44  526.29**  1839.60*** 725.73*** 2039.05***
Complete secondary  1145.26  697.55  1263.66 2470.46  447.72***  118.40 1325.20*** 566.12*** 1772.92***
Some terciary  1611.20  592.42  1856.46 3629.37 1018.77***  245.26 2018.18*** 1264.03**  3036.95***
Complete terciary  3904.24  2621.71  5598.48 10945.03 1282.53  1694.24** 7040.79*** 2976.77*  8323.32** 
          
Women          
Some primary  646.91  529.53  600.59  1174.16 117.4  -46.32 527.25**  71.06 644.63***
Complete primary  532.54  448.27  548.70 1072.71  84.3  16.2  540.20*** 100.44  624.44***
Some secondary  857.26  639.12  923.07 1804.61  218.14*  65.81  947.34*** 283.95*  1165.49***
Complete secondary  829.61  957.65  1149.52 2247.31 -128.04  319.91**  1417.70*** 191.87 1289.66***
Some  terciary  1098.01 1100.04 1175.80 2298.68 -2.02 77.8  1200.70**  75.76  1198.66 
Complete  terciary  2927.70 1351.54 2604.55 5091.89 1576.20**  -323.15 2164.20**  1253.01 3740.35* 
    
“***” indicates significance at 1%; “**” at 5%; “*” at 10% 
(1) Using unadjusted earnings for self-employed 








Table 4.  Predicted Hourly Earnings, and Earnings Differentials Corrected for Sample Selection Bias,  
by Sector and Educational Attainment 
 
(As Discussed in Appendix) 
 
  Predicted Hourly Earnings, 1998    Predicted Differentials 
 Contract  worker 
(cw) 




 se  -  cw  cw-nc 
     (i)  (ii)    (i)  (ii)   
             
Some Primary  547.047  297.038  1040.693 532.003  493.646  -15.045  250.010 
Complete Primary  598.893  316.438 1196.580  610.840  597.687  11.948 282.455 
Some Secondary  651.698  329.262 1363.917  696.838  712.219  45.140 322.436 
Complete Secondary  803.453  362.859 1809.369  919.071  1005.916 115.618 440.594 
Some Terciary  1177.938  516.830 3046.619  1549.718  1868.681 371.780 661.108 
Complete Terciary  3055.027  981.961 7679.537  3893.239  4624.509 838.211  2073.067 
             
All Sample  790.731  377.030  1704.637 868.696  913.905  77.965  413.701 
(i) Uses adjusted earnings 





Table 5. Worker Transitions Between Sectors and In and Out of Employment, 
December 1998 to December 1999/January 2000 
 
Labor Market Status in PRIESO:  All Respondents  Male Respondents 14 - 65 
i.  Of all “Switchers”   No. Obs.  %  No. Obs.  % 
    
Inactive 138  18.83  23  6.32 
Unemployed  &  Searching  141  19.24 67 18.41 
Non-Contract  Wage  155  21.15 89 24.45 
Self-employed 137  18.69  79  21.7 
Contract  Wage  162 22.1 106  29.12 
      
Total 733  100  364  100 
      
ii.  Those who Entered the Labor Market       
      
Unemployed  &  Searching  67 30.73 22 30.56 
Non-Contract  Wage  56 25.69 22 30.56 
Self-employed  52 23.85 12 16.67 
Contract  Wage  43 19.72 16 22.22 
      
Total 218  100  72  100 
       
iii.  Switched out of Unemployment        
      
Inactive 29  28.43  4  6.9 
Non-Contract  Wage  21 20.59 15 25.86 
Self-employed  22 21.57 17 29.31 
Contract  Wage  30 29.41 22 37.93 
      
Total 102  100  58  100 
      
iv.  Switched out of Non-Contract Wage       
      
Inactive   44  26.04  6  6.74 
Unemployed  &  Searching  27 15.98 12 13.48 
Self-employed  33 19.53 24 26.97 
Contract  Wage  65 38.46 47 52.81 
      
Total 169  100  89  100 
      
v.  Switched out of Self-employment       
      
Inactive   41  39.81  7  12.5 
Unemployed & Searching  14  13.59  9  16.07 
Non-Contract Wage  24  23.3  19  33.93 
Contract  Wage  24 23.3 21 37.5 
      
Total 103  100  56  100 
      
vi. Switched out of Contract Wage       
      
Inactive   24  17.02  6  6.74 
Unemployed & Searching  33  23.4  24  26.97 
Non-Contract Wage  54  38.3  33  37.08 
Self-employed  30 21.28 26 29.21 
      
Total 141  100  89  100 
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LSTATPR  Labor market status in the PRIESO 1999/2000, taking the value 0 – 5 for each sector, 
unemployment and inactivity (dependent variable) 
HEAD  Dummy = 1 if head of household 
MARRIED  Dummy = 1 if married during the CASEN 1998 
RURAL  Dummy = 1 if  
NYKIDS  Number of kids age 0 – 9 in the household 
NKIDS  Number of kids age 10 – 13 in the household 
AGE  Age at the time of the CASEN 1998 
YEDU  Years of education 
COLLAT  Dummy = 1 if owned own home, another home or rental property ten years prior to 
PRIESO (in 1990) 
NOTHSEL  Number of other household members who are self-employed 
INAC98  Dummy = 1 if inactive during CASEN 1998, interacted with all variables above 
UNEM98  Dummy = 1 if unemployed during CASEN 1998, interacted with all variables above 
CWRK98  Dummy = 1 if contract wage worker during CASEN 1998, interacted with all variables 
above 
INFW98  Dummy = 1 if non-contract wage worker during CASEN 1998, interacted with all 
variables above 




Table 7. Mean Age, Education, Collateral and Number of Self-employed Household 
Members, by Labor Market Status  
(December 1998 in rows, December 1999/January 2000 in columns) 
December 1998  December 1999/January 2000 
(i) Age at time of PRIESO 
 Contract  No  Contract  Self-employed Unemployed  Inactive 
Contract  39.92 38.89 37.27 32.33 50.75 
No  contract 34.63 36.27 40.08 40.33 44.44 
Self-employed  38.41 43.48 47.37 43.22 65.81 
Unemployed  30.23 28.53 39.06 35.90 42.80 
Inactive  31.89 27.30 48.56 29.50 53.40 
      
(ii) Years of Education 
 Contract  No  Contract  Self-employed Unemployed  Inactive 
Contract  9.51  9.35 10.92 8.79 11.25 
No  contract 8.17 8.27 8.46 7.67 9.89 
Self-employed  11.59  8.81 9.90 5.22 7.00 
Unemployed  8.82 8.80 8.83 9.80 9.00 
Inactive 10.50  9.70  9.69  10.23  8.14 
       
(iii) Share who Held Collateral 
 Contract  No  Contract  Self-employed Unemployed  Inactive 
Contract  0.480 0.290 0.690 0.250 0.750 
No  contract 0.310 0.460 0.440 0.500 0.444 
Self-employed  0.630 0.280 0.740 0.660 0.930 
Unemployed  0.273 0.200 0.500 0.300 0.400 
Inactive  0.270 0.050 0.560 0.180 0.550 
       
(iv) Number of Other Self-employed in the Household 
 Contract  No  Contract  Self-employed Unemployed  Inactive 
Contract  0.119 0.135 0.192 0.125 0.125 
No  contract 0.229 0.100 0.240 0.080 0.220 
Self-employed  0.090 0.381 0.311 0.220 0.125 
Unemployed  0.270 0.200 0.050 0.100 0.200 
Inactive  0.440 0.200 0.380 0.410 0.220 
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Table 8. Multinomial Logit on Labor Market Transitions from December 1998 to 
December 1999/January 2000 
(Omitted Category: Contract Workers in December 1999/January 2000) 
  Unemployed 1999/2000  NC Employed 1999/2000 Self-employed  1999/2000 
 Coefficient  Std.  Err.  Coefficient  Std. Err.  Coefficient  Std. Err. 
INFW98  -5.449 (5.902) 0.955 (2.911) 0.146 (3.963) 
SELF98 -20.638  .  -5.270  (4.379)  -1.914  (4.314) 
UNEMP98  -11.824 (9.966) 3.096 (4.622) 0.906 (5.897) 
INAC98  8.929 (4.157)**  1.901 (3.244) 4.409 (3.914) 
Contract  1998        
HEAD  -0.615 (0.564)  -0.149 (0.543)  -0.804 (0.748) 
MARRIED  -1.006 (0.574)*  0.121 (0.445) 1.193 (0.698)* 
RURAL  0.351 (0.565) 0.166 (0.475) 0.939 (0.517)* 
NYKIDS -0.041  (0.271)  0.000  (0.209) -0.135  (0.271) 
NKIDS  -1.243 (0.703)*  -0.069 (0.322)  -0.066 (0.362) 
AGE  0.237 (0.190)  -0.120 (0.084) 0.003 (0.150) 
AGE
2  -0.004 (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) 
YEDU  -0.111 (0.064)*  0.000 (0.051) 0.098 (0.062) 
COLLAT -0.374  (0.549)  -0.758 (0.421)*  0.956 (0.495)** 
NOTHSEL  -0.509 (0.611) 0.023 (0.472) 0.509 (0.501) 
Non-Contract 1998        
HEAD  -0.434 (1.702) 0.425 (1.407)  -0.008 (1.609) 
MARRIED  0.561 (1.823)  -0.470 (1.931)  -1.003 (1.512) 
RURAL  -2.518 (1.270)  -0.927 (1.004) 0.404 (1.015) 
NYKIDS -0.550  (0.636)  -0.228 (0.620) 0.273 (0.586) 
NKIDS 0.702  (0.995)  1.895 (0.955)**  -0.955 (1.336) 
AGE  -0.214 (0.126)*  -0.040 (0.152)  -0.126 (0.130) 
AGE
2  0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 
YEDU  -0.109 (0.124)  -0.125 (0.137) 0.061 (0.121) 
COLLAT  -0.659 (1.313)  -1.709 (1.741)  -0.549 (1.488) 
NOTHSEL  0.153 (0.568)  -0.905 (0.731) 0.118 (0.641) 
Self-employed 1998        
HEAD  24.259 (7.348)***  1.673 (1.251) 1.152 (0.930) 
MARRIED -0.854  (1.176)  -1.667 (0.956)*  -0.341 (0.795) 
RURAL  -1.965 (1.584) 0.837 (0.973) 0.303 (0.766) 
NYKIDS 0.137  (0.566)  -0.218  (0.419) -0.020  (0.270) 
NKIDS  -0.635 (1.028) 0.836 (0.654)  -0.037 (0.521) 
AGE  0.238 (0.271) 0.210 (0.168) 0.288 (0.138)** 
AGE
2  -0.003 (0.003)  -0.001 (0.002)  -0.002 (0.001)* 
YEDU  -0.481 (0.153)***  -0.089 (0.090)  -0.074 (0.065) 
COLLAT -0.719  (1.047)  -2.437 (0.864)***  -0.264 (0.625) 
NOTHSEL  2.785 (1.262)**  1.713 (1.033)*  2.064 (0.925)** 
Number of obs  866
Log likelihood  -696.275
LR 
2 χ  (177)  652.880
Prob > 
2 χ   0.000
Pseudo R
2  0.319
“***” statistically significant at 1%; “**” at 5%; and “*” at 10% 
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Table 8 (Continued from Previous Page). 
Multinomial Logit on Labor Market Transitions from December 1998  
to December 1999/January 2000 
(Omitted Category: Contract Workers in December 1999/January 2000) 
  Unemployed 1999/2000  NC Employed 1999/2000 Self-employed  1999/2000 
 Coefficient  Std.  Err.  Coefficient  Std. Err.  Coefficient  Std. Err. 
Unemployed 1998        
HEAD  -0.731 (1.396) 0.433 (1.204) 1.804 (1.393) 
MARRIED  -0.317 (1.489)  -0.906 (1.323)  -1.997 (1.322) 
RURAL  -30.793 (4.E+06)  -0.723 (1.458) 0.313 (1.174) 
NYKIDS 0.445  (0.492) 0.265 (0.449) 0.898 (0.454)** 
NKIDS  -0.656 (1.147)  -1.012 (0.835) 0.767 (0.766) 
AGE  0.698 (0.523)  -0.165 (0.229)  -0.077 (0.276) 
AGE
2  -0.008 (0.007) 0.002 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 
YEDU  0.099 (0.119)  -0.053 (0.106) 0.131 (0.110) 
COLLAT  -0.453 (1.040)  -0.183 (0.912) 0.229 (0.971) 
NOTHSEL  -0.550 (1.147)  -0.714 (0.903)  -3.173 (2.658) 
Inactive 1998        
HEAD  -0.434 (1.702) 0.425 (1.407)  -0.008 (1.609) 
MARRIED  0.561 (1.823)  -0.470 (1.931)  -1.003 (1.512) 
RURAL  -2.518 (1.270)**  -0.927 (1.004) 0.404 (1.015) 
NYKIDS -0.550  (0.636)  -0.228 (0.620) 0.273 (0.586) 
NKIDS 0.702  (0.995)  1.895 (0.955)**  -0.955 (1.336) 
AGE  -0.214 (0.126)*  -0.040 (0.152)  -0.126 (0.130) 
AGE
2  0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 
YEDU  -0.109 (0.124)  -0.125 (0.137) 0.061 (0.121) 
COLLAT  -0.659 (1.313)  -1.709 (1.741)  -0.549 (1.488) 
NOTHSEL  0.153 (0.568)  -0.905 (0.731) 0.118 (0.641) 
Number of obs  866     
Log likelihood  -696.275     
LR 
2 χ  (177)  652.880     
Prob > 
2 χ   0.000     
Pseudo R
2  0.319     




The Heckman-Lee Correction for Sample Selection Bias:  
An Application to Sector Choice in Chile 
Much of the literature on sector choice, especially in developing countries, relies on 
traditional cross-section analysis of wage differentials, corrected for possible sample selection 
bias.  In this appendix, I apply the same methodology to analyze labor market insertion in 
Chile, estimate earnings differentials and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this 
approach. 
This appendix has three sections.  Section A.I presents the Heckman (1979) two-step method, 
and the innovations on the method made by Lee (1983).  Section A.II presents the results of 
the Heckman-Lee procedure, first on the entire sample of male workers in Greater 
Metropolitan Santiago from the CASEN 1998, and then on a sample restricted to employees 
with and without a legal employment contract.  Section A.III concludes with a word of 
warning about analysis of earnings differentials and the two-step procedure. 
A.I. Approach and Hypotheses 
Using a two-stage procedure, I estimate sample selection terms that then enter into earnings 
equations.  For Chile, I model three employment types: a “formal sector” of contract-wage 
employed (subscript, cw); and an “informal sector” made up of non-contract wage employed 
(nc), and self-employment (se).
24  A Mincerian earnings equation is given by    
ji ji j ji u X Y + = β  (1) 
where Y is earned take-home income, j denotes the three employment types (cw, nc, and se), 
and  i represents the i
th worker; β  is a vector of estimated parameters; X is a vector of 
exogenous variables that determine earnings, including individual and household 
characteristics, experience, endowment of human capital, and characteristics of the place of 
employment; u is a disturbance term. 
                                                 
24 As shown empirically in Yamada (1996) and Maloney (1998a), it is not sufficient to simply lump non-
contracted wage employees with the self-employed in a single “informal-sector” category.  F tests show that the 
two groups of workers are (statistically) significantly different with respect to several variables in the selection 
model, notably age, number of dependent children, and their holdings of human capital.  
43 
If workers in each of the three employment types shared the same characteristics, OLS 
estimates would be unbiased.  However, if individuals with unobservable characteristics (such 
as greater tolerance for risk, a desire for independence, or entrepreneurial talent) select into 
self-employment, the sample of self-employed would not be a random draw from the 
population, and OLS estimates would be inconsistent.  Heckman (1979) proposes a two-stage 
procedure where the probability of selection into each employment type is estimated first by 
using a discrete choice model.  Let z* be a continuous, unobserved variable which determines 
choice of employment type. 
i i W z ε γ + =
*  (2) 
where W is a vector of exogenous variables which influence where individuals choose to 
work, and γ  is a vector of coefficients and  ) , 0 ( ~
2
ε σ ε N .  If there is any correlation between 
the unobserved influences on choice of employment type (captured in  i ε ) and the unobserved 
influences on earnings (captured in ui), OLS estimates of the earnings function will be biased.  
Following Heckman (1979), I assume that  i ε  and ui are jointly distributed as a bivariate 
normal distribution.  Thus the selection term λ , is the inverse of the Mills ratio, computed 
from the probabilities of employment type, and expressed 
) / ( / ) / ( ε ε σ γ σ γ φ λ W W Φ =  (3) 
where φ  is the standard normal density function, and Φ is the cumulative normal distribution 
function.  The selection term λ  is then included as an additional regressor in the earnings 
equation, as follows. 
ji ji j ji j ji u c X Y + + = λ β  (4) 
The coefficient cj  on  ji λ  will be a measure of the bias arising from non-random sample 
selection. 
The Heckman (1979) correction is most often used to model binary choices.  Since I am 
modeling the choice between three different employment types,
25 an unordered multinomial 
                                                 




probit would be ideal, but computationally cumbersome.  Lee (1983) proposes a 
transformation, used by Kingdon (1996), to calculate inverse Mills ratios from a selection 
equation specified as a multinomial logit.
26 
Lee (1983) explains that the probability of selection into a particular sector,  ) ( W γ Φ , can be 
obtained from a multinomial logit model.  ) ( W γ φ is evaluated at the inverse of the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function at this estimated probability. To estimate λ , the 
multinomial logit is estimated, and the coefficients and full set of predicted probabilities are 
retained.  Taking the observations that have selected into a particular sector – say, self-
employment -  se λ  is computed by first taking the predicted probability  se P  and then 
) ( ,
1
, i se i se P H
− Φ = , the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution function 
evaluated at the probability that observation i selects self-employment.  se λ  can then be 
estimated as  ) ( / ) ( , , i se i se se H H Φ = φ λ . 
From the discussion of competing views of labor markets in developing countries in the text, 
if self-employment is part of the residual half of a dualistic labor market in Chile and the self-
employed are simply queuing along with the unemployed in the hope for an opening in the 
formal sector, we would expect the predicted earnings of the self-employed to be significantly 
less than those of salaried workers.  We would further expect the coefficient on  se λ  in the 
earnings equation of the self-employed to be negative or not statistically significant.
27  On the 
other hand, if workers with unobservable traits that lead them to succeed as entrepreneurs 
systematically choose self-employment, the coefficient on  se λ  should be positive. 
Further, if formal salaried (contract) employment in Chile is rationed and workers in informal 
(non-contract) employment are queuing for formal jobs, we would expect the coefficient on 
nc λ  in the earnings equation to be negative.  Alternatively, if a significant number of informal 
employees choose non-contract employment - and lower earnings in the sector reflect the 
opportunity costs of a decision to keep investing in human capital while they work, the costs 
                                                 
26 I am grateful to Dr. Geeta Kingdon and Dr. William Greene at New York University for providing both 
guidance and assistance in conducting this procedure. 
 
27 The estimated coefficient on the selection term might not be statistically significant if, for example, entry into 
self-employment is determined by access to capital to cover start-up costs. 
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to employers of offering job training, or other apprenticeship arrangements - the coefficient 
on  nc λ  would either be positive or not significantly different from zero.  The hypotheses to be 
tested with the Heckman-Lee procedure are formally summarized below. 
Ceteris paribus…  Null  Alternative 
1. Do the self-employed earn competitive incomes 
relative to formal salaried workers? 
0 ˆ ˆ : 0 < − cw se y y H   0 ˆ ˆ : 1 ≥ − cw se y y H  
2. Do individuals with unobservable characteristics – 
that positively determine entrepreneurial earnings - 
systematically select into self-employment? 
0 : 0 = se c H  0 : 1 > se c H  
3. Do workers choose the informal (non-contracted) 
wage employment (or are they rationed out of 
otherjobs)? 
0 : 0 < nc c H  0 : 1 ≥ nc c H  
Tests of the hypotheses presented above will give some indication of whether workers enter 
the informal sector by chance or by choice.  However, Maloney (2000) points out that studies 
that rely solely on earnings differentials – even controlling for sample selection bias - cannot 
prove or disprove either characterization of the labor market.  Wage differentials fail to 
capture the value of unmeasured characteristics of different kinds of work, such as non-wage 
benefits, compensation for risk, independence, greater flexibility, in-kind payments, or 
implicit training costs.  Maloney (2000) stresses that the magnitude of the distortion-free 
differential cannot be known beforehand, and hence researchers have no benchmark against 
which to compare segmentation.  Just as the premium for entering formal salaried work or 
self-employment does not imply that either sector is superior or that workers queue for jobs in 
the higher paying sector, the discount on earnings in informal employment cannot be taken as 
conclusive evidence that the sector is inferior. 
A.II. Determinants of Earnings in Contract Employment, Self-employment, and 
Employment Without a Contract 
The sample for the first part of this analysis is taken from the CASEN 1998, and consists of 
male respondents between the ages of fourteen and 65 from Greater Metropolitan Santiago 
who were employed at the time of the survey.
28 The definitions of the variables used in each 
                                                 
28 I chose a male sample because of the well known and documented differences in the labor supply decisions 
and earnings equations for men and women.  Similar studies (Taylor, 1996, Yamada, 1996, Maloney, 1998a & 
1998b, Pages & Montenegro, 1999) also limited analysis to a male sample.  I further limited the sample to 
respondents from Santiago in order to ensure comparability with the PRIESO sample.  Running the same model  
46 
step are given in Table A.1. All of the variables included are those traditionally employed in 
the Heckman-Lee procedure.  For the first step, these include age and its square, individual 
and household characteristics (whether the respondent is head of household, married, the 
number of younger and older dependent children, and whether the respondent resides in a 
rural area), and variables for highest level of educational attainment.  In the second step, 
variables determining earnings also include age and its square as proxies for experience, 
whether the respondent is married,
29 educational attainment, the rural dummy and the size of 
the firm in which the respondent works.  The only exceptional variable requiring explanation 
(included in the first step) is NOTHSEL – the number of household members other than the 
respondent who declare themselves as self-employed.
30  I include this variable in the selection 
equation specifically to test the apprenticeship hypotheses of non-contracted employment – 
namely, that a greater number of self-employed in the household increases the opportunities 
for informal apprenticeships for younger household members. 
The results of the Heckman-Lee procedure are presented in Tables A.2 and A.3.  The 
(omitted) reference category are contract employees – the “formal sector” workers in this 
analysis.  This specification captures significant differences between the two branches of the 
informal sector and formal salaried employment.
31 
With respect to contract employees, those without a contract are likely to be younger, In 
contrast, the self-employed are likely to be significantly older than contract workers. Aroca 
and Maloney (1999) similarly find that self-employed workers in Mexico tend to be older, and 
argue that in developing economies where capital markets are distorted or missing and where 
                                                                                                                                                         
on all male respondents to the CASEN did not change the sign or significance on the estimated coefficients.  
Inactive male respondents – those not employed, nor searching for a job – were excluded after tests showed that 
they were significantly different from the unemployed with respect to age, position in the household and 
educational attainment. 
 
29 In many labor markets marriage is seen as a sign of stability and commitment, and is often rewarded with a 
salary premium. 
 
30 This variable is discussed at length earlier. 
 
31 In an alternative specification of the sector choice model (step one of the Heckman-Lee procedure), I used the 
unemployed as the reference category to captures significant differences between those employed in each of the 
three sectors, and those still searching for a job.  The results show that workers in both branches of the informal 
sector are significantly different from the unemployed.  Compared with the unemployed, non-contract workers 
have attained lower levels of education.  In contrast, the self-employed are more likely than those still searching 
for a job to have completed primary, secondary and university education.  
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there is little access to credit, only older workers have had sufficient time to amass the capital 
(or collateral for a loan) necessary to start their own business. 
Workers without a contract are less likely to be married or heads of household. On the other 
hand, the self-employed are more likely than contract workers to be heads of household.  
However, the self-employed are significantly less likely to be married, which may indicate 
that self-employment is prevalent among single men and those with fewer dependent 
household members.  This said, the number of younger (0 to 9) and older (10 – 13) children in 
the household - included to capture the consideration of dependent family members in 
workers’ decisions between employment options with different degrees of income risks - have 
no significant effect on the likelihood of self-employment.  Non-contract workers, on the 
other hand, are significantly more likely to come from households with a larger number of 
older children. 
Living in rural areas increases the probability of employment without a contract, but seems to 
have no effect on the likelihood that the respondent is self-employed.  This last finding seems 
surprising since one might expect a large number of self-employed in rural farming.   
However, farming in Chile has rapidly grown out of the traditional model of household 
enterprise on small family-owned plots of land, and into a larger scale export industry, 
dramatically changing the allocation of labor between the sectors in rural areas (Thomas, 
1996). 
Compared to those with a contract, non-contracted workers are less educated.  This finding 
can be interpreted either negatively – i.e. that a lack of educational attainment is acting as a 
barrier between these workers and the relative security of a contract – or positively – i.e. that 
an informal, flexible arrangement is preferred while these workers are still accumulating 
human capital, in the form of further study, experience and specific job skills.  Compared to 
contract-wage workers, the self-employed are more likely to be heads of household but less 
likely to be married.  Further, the self-employed are less likely than contract workers to have 
studied beyond secondary education.  This is consistent with other studies that show few 
returns to the self-employed from formal education beyond secondary school (Taylor 1996). 
The most interesting result in the first stage equations, is the strong significance of the number 
of  other self-employed in the household on the sector in which the respondent works.   
Compared to contract workers, the self-employed have a higher number of other household  
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members who also say they are running their own business.  This could indicate either that 
several household members are being declared as independently self-employed even if they 
work in the same household enterprise, or it may be evidence of entrepreneurial traits shared 
among family members.
32  Evidence of entrepreneurial traits passed between generations in 
the same family has been found by Taylor (1996) and Blanchflower and Oswald (1998). The 
number of other household members in self-employment not only significantly increases the 
probability that the respondent has their own business, but also increases the probability that 
the respondent is working as an employee without a contract.  Given the relative youth of 
non-contract wage workers, this may be further evidence of apprenticeships offered by family 
members who own their own businesses. 
Turning to the second-stage earnings equations in Table A.3, the estimated coefficients on the 
Mincerian variables controlling for workers’ experience (proxied by AGE and AGE2) and 
their endowment of human capital, where significant, bear the expected signs.  The coefficient 
on  se λ  indicates that there is significant (10%) positive selection into self-employment in 
Santiago, similar to that found by Yamada (1996) in Lima.  The coefficient on  se λ  may be 
capturing the influence of unobservable tolerance for risk, entrepreneurial talent, and/or desire 
for independence - or indeed any other omitted variable that is positively affecting the 
earnings performance of the sample in self-employment.  The coefficient on the sample 
selection term for non-contract employment is also positive and significant (5%).  This result 
is somewhat surprising given the significantly lower hourly earnings of workers without a 
contract, but provides further evidence to support the apprenticeship hypothesis.
33 
The mean predicted hourly earnings (corrected for sample selection bias and dissagregated by 
respondents’ highest educational attainment), are presented in Table A.4.  The results of the 
correction for sample selection bias indicate that, all else equal, the self-employed can earn up 
to twice as much as contracted wage employees.  Readers will note that the positive earnings 
differentials between self and contract employment hold even when unadjusted earnings are 
                                                 
32 The way the survey interview is conducted is important to interpreting this result.  Rather than conduct several 
interviews in the same household, numerators receive information on each household member form a single 
spokesperson.  This single informant is usually the spouse of the household head.  Gathering data from a single 
spokesperson lowers the likelihood that household members who work in the same household enterprise are 
incorrectly coded as independently self-employed. 
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used in the two-step procedure, for all but the category of workers with incomplete primary 
education. 
However, these results should be interpreted with extreme caution. I found the results of the 
Heckman-Lee procedure to be very unstable. While the two step procedure performed on a 
sample of all male respondents to the CASEN (nationally and in Santiago) shows significant 
positive selection into self-employment and non-contract wage employment, the result is not 
robust to changes in the sample or a reduction in the sample size.  When I include men 
searching for employment in the procedure, the coefficient on the selection term into self-
employment is no longer significant.  When I restrict the CASEN sample to responses from 
the 935 men of working age who would respond to the PRIESO twelve months later, the 
coefficients on the selection terms remained positive, but were no longer significant.   
Repeating the model on the sample of PRIESO respondents, but this time using data from the 
second survey, the estimated coefficients on the selection terms for non-contract employment 
and self-employment were both negative, but neither was statistically significant.  This might 
be due partially to the smaller sample size, and to the significantly more adverse 
macroeconomic and labor market conditions at the time of the PRIESO. Furthermore, as 
discussed at length the CASEN survey may systematically over-state the earnings of the self-
employed by failing to separate profit from revenue.  The survey does not take account of the 
costs of operating a business, nor do the rest of the questions in the labor module allow 
researchers to net-out the returns to physical capital. 
In order to test the robustness of the positive selection term in the earnings equation of 
workers employed without a contract, I repeat the Heckman-Lee procedure, but this time 
exclude the self-employed for whom the earnings data are suspect and might have biased 
earlier results.  Both steps of the Heckman-Lee procedure are shown in Table A.5.  In the first 
step, a probit equation takes a dummy, equal to 1 if the respondent is employed without a 
contract and 0 with a contract, as the dependent variable.  The estimated coefficients in the 
selection equation do not differ greatly from those in the multinomial logit in the first column 
in Table A.2, and remain significant at the same confidence levels.  The only significant 
different between the estimated coefficients in the first column of Table A.5 and the earlier 
                                                                                                                                                         
33 There was no difference in the size and signs of the coefficients on any of the regressors (except the intercept) 
nor on the selection terms, when the earnings of the self-employed were “unadjusted” (that is, divided by 1.955 – 
a reversal of the adjustment for under-reporting).  
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selection equation, is that completing tertiary education significantly lowers the likelihood of 
employment without a contract at the 1% confidence level.  In the multinomial logit, tertiary 
education had no significant effect on the likelihood of employment without a contract. 
In contrast, the estimated coefficients in the second-step earnings equation in Table A.5, differ 
greatly with those for the earnings of workers without a contract in Table A.3. While not 
significant in the earlier specification, the estimated coefficients on age, its square, and the 
dummy variables controlling for whether the respondent completed primary, some secondary 
and a full secondary education are all statistically significant.  However, the most important 
difference between the two specifications of the earnings equations for workers without a 
contract, is that the coefficient on the selection term λ - positive and significant at 5% in 
Table A.3 - is no longer significantly different from zero, with a p-value of 0.985.  This result 
contradicts the findings discussed above, and weakens the argument that workers might 
choose employment without a contract. 
A.III.  Conclusion 
Using a Heckman-Lee two-step procedure to correct for sample selection bias, I find positive 
sample selection into self-employment and employment without a contract in a cross section 
of workers in 1998. Although I find positive sample selection, this may be capturing any 
number of unobservable traits that positively determine earnings performance.  In Barr and 
Packard (2002), economic experiments and hypothetical questions designed to measure risk 
aversion and time preference, show that the self-employed are not significantly different from 
employees with respect to these two unobservable parameters.  The positive selection into 
self-employment discussed in this Appendix might reflect any number of unobservable traits, 
such as flexibility, motivation, entrepreneurial ability and a greater desire for independence.  
Similarly, positive selection into informal wage employment may be evidence of an 
apprenticeship mechanism at work. 
However, the results of the Heckman-Lee procedure do not stand up to even small changes in 
the sample.  Nor do the results stand when the procedure is conducted on the same sample of 
workers from one year to the next. While the Heckman-Lee two-stage techniques are 
powerful tools for capturing unobserved, individual characteristics that may be correlated 
with both sector choice and earnings, they are criticized for yielding unstable results and for  
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being sensitive to the choice of model in the first-step selection equation (Manski, 1989, 
Maloney, 1998a, Puhani, 2000).  Heckman (1979) warns that the two-step method depends 
critically on having confidence in the underlying model of how workers choose among the 
sectors, and that if this model is incorrect, the procedure can actually introduce more biases 
than it corrects.  The analysis in this Appendix shows that a cross-section examination of 
earnings differentials, traditionally employed to examine sector choice, cannot on its own 
provide sufficient evidence of how the labor market functions to adequately inform social 
insurance policy.  
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Table A.1.  Variables Included in Heckman-Lee, Two-Step Procedure 
 
Variable  Description  In Step I  In Step II
    
AGE Respondents  age  yes  yes 
AGE2  Quadratic of AGE  yes  yes 
HEAD  Dummy = 1 if head of household  yes  no 
MARRIED  Dummy = 1 if married  yes  yes 
NYKIDS  Number of kids age 0 – 9 in the household  yes  no 
NKIDS  Number of kids age 10 – 13 in the household  yes  no 
NOTHSEL  Number of other household members who are self-employed  yes  no 
RURAL  Dummy = 1 if resides in rural area  yes  yes 
INCPRIM  Dummy = 1 if some primary school is highest educational 
attainment 
yes yes 
PRIM  Dummy = 1 if completed primary school is highest educational 
attainment 
yes yes 
INCSEC  Dummy = 1 if some secondary school is highest educational 
attainment 
yes yes 
SEC  Dummy = 1 if completed secondary school is highest 
educational attainment 
yes yes 
INCTER  Dummy = 1 if some university is highest educational attainment yes  yes 
TER  Dummy = 1 if completed university is highest educational 
attainment 
yes yes 
FSIZE  Number of workers in place of work  no  yes 
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Table A.2.  Sector Choice Equation,  
Male Respondents to the CASEN 1998, Greater Metropolitan Santiago 
 
  Omitted Category: Contract Wage 
Selection into…  No-Contract Employment  Self-employment 
    
Constant 1.455  -3.080 
 (0.253)***  (0.274)*** 
AGE -0.094  0.071 
 (0.014)***  (0.014)*** 
AGE2 0.001  0.000 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)** 
HEAD -0.068  0.351 
 (0.072)  (0.067)*** 
MARRIED -0.491  -0.272 
 (0.066)***  (0.057)*** 
NYKIDS 0.005  -0.030 
 (0.029)  (0.026) 
NKIDS 0.142  0.030 
 (0.044)***  (0.040) 
RURAL 0.358  -0.070 
 (0.064)***  (0.064) 
PRIM -0.292  0.029 
 (0.087)***  (0.082) 
INCSEC -0.481  -0.098 
 (0.077)***  (0.072) 
SEC -1.058  -0.324 
 (0.078)***  (0.068)*** 
INCTER -1.030  -0.353 
 (0.098)***  (0.083)*** 
TER -1.506  -0.210 
 (0.150)  (0.089)** 
NOTHSEL 0.161  0.922 
 (0.057)***  (0.045)*** 
    
No.  Obs.  2083  3040 
Total Obs.  12494   
Log Likelihood  -11026.3   
2 χ [26]***  1783.24  
    
Standard errors in parentheses 
“***” statistically significant at 1%; “**” at 5%; and “*” at 10% 
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Table A.3.  Earnings Equations Corrected for Sample Selection Bias 
 
  No-Contract Employment  Self-employment 
   
Constant 5.633  5.654 
 (0.129)***  (0.213)*** 
AGE 0.000  0.046 
 (0.012)  (0.008)*** 
AGE2 0.000  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)*** 
MARRIED -0.019  0.099 
 (0.055)  (0.032)*** 
PRIM 0.017  0.188 
 (0.053)  (0.051)*** 
INCSEC 0.041  0.302 
 (0.060)  (0.045)*** 
SEC 0.053  0.505 
 (0.106)  (0.042)*** 
INCTER 0.431  1.010 
 (0.109)***  (0.053)*** 
TER 0.998  1.787 
 (0.168)***  (0.056)*** 
RURAL -0.096 -0.234 
 (0.050)*  (0.040)*** 
FSIZE 0.000  0.003 
 (0.000)  (0.000)*** 
λ   0.543 0.119 
 (0.226)**  (0.064)* 
    
No. of Obs.  1896  2928 
R
2 0.24  0.36 
ρ   0.80 0.15 
  
Standard errors in parentheses 









Table A.4.  Predicted Hourly Earnings, and Earnings Differentials 
Corrected for Sample Selection Bias 
 
  Predicted Hourly Earnings, 1998    Predicted Differentials 
 Contract  worker 
(cw) 




 se  -  cw  cw-nc 
     (i)  (ii)    (i)  (ii)   
             
Some Primary  547.047  297.038  1040.693 532.003  493.646  -15.045  250.010 
Complete Primary  598.893  316.438 1196.580  610.840  597.687  11.948 282.455 
Some Secondary  651.698  329.262 1363.917  696.838  712.219  45.140 322.436 
Complete Secondary  803.453  362.859 1809.369  919.071  1005.916 115.618 440.594 
Some Terciary  1177.938  516.830 3046.619  1549.718  1868.681 371.780 661.108 
Complete Terciary  3055.027  981.961 7679.537  3893.239  4624.509 838.211  2073.067 
             
All Sample  790.731  377.030  1704.637 868.696  913.905  77.965  413.701 
(i) Uses adjusted earnings 
(ii) Uses unadjusted earnings  
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Table A.5. Heckman-Lee Procedure on Contract and Non-Contract Employment 
 Omitted Category: Contract Employment 
  Step 1  Step 2 
  Selection Into Non-Contract 
Employment 
Earnings of Non-Contract 
Employed 
    
Constant 1.630  5.702 
 (0.261)***  (0.121)*** 
AGE -0.101  0.024 
 (0.015)***  (0.012)** 
AGE
2 0.001  -2.5E-04 
 (1.8E-04)***  (1.3E-04)* 
HEAD -0.063   
 (0.072)   
MARRIED -0.485  0.088 
 (0.067)***  (0.057) 
NYKIDS -0.003   
 (0.029)   
NKIDS 0.150   
 (0.044)***   
RURAL 0.347  -0.186 
 (0.065)***  (0.044)*** 
PRIM -0.297 0.084 
 (0.088)***  (0.050)* 
INCSEC -0.501  0.148 
 (0.078)***  (0.062)** 
SEC -1.097  0.284 
 (0.080)***  (0.111)*** 
INCTER -1.083  0.655 
 (0.099)***  (0.113)*** 
TER -1.531  1.337 
 (0.151)***  (0.168)*** 
NOTHSEL 0.205   
 (0.057)***   
FSIZE   2.2E-04 
   (2.0E-04) 
λ    0.011 
   (0.216) 
 
No of Obs.  2083   
Total Obs.  9454   
Log Likelihood  -4597.809   
2 χ [13]***  775.050  
R
2   0.233 
ρ    2.0E-02 
Standard errors in parentheses 
“***” statistically significant at 1%; “**” at 5%; and “*” at 10% 
 
 